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SCIENCE AND LAW

Is it time for a universal
genetic forensic database?
Bias and privacy concerns cloud police use of genetics
By J. W. Hazel1,2, E. W. Clayton1,2,3,
B. A. Malin2,4,5,6, C. Slobogin2,3

D

NA is an increasingly useful crimesolving tool. But still quite unclear is
the extent to which law enforcement
should be able to obtain genetic data
housed in public and private databases. How one answers that question might vary substantially, depending on
the source of the data. Several countries—the
United Kingdom, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia
among them—have even toyed with creating a “universal” DNA database, populated
with data from every individual in society,
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obviating the need for any other DNA source
(1). Although this move would be controversial, it may not be as dramatic as one might
think. In the United States, for example, the
combination of state and federal databases
(containing genetic profiles of more than 16.5
million arrestees and convicts) and public
and private databases (containing genetic
data of tens of millions of patients, consumers, and research participants) already provides the government with potential access
to genetic information that can be linked to
a large segment of the country, either directly
or through a relative (2, 3). We discuss here
how, if correctly implemented, a universal
database would likely be more productive
and less discriminatory than our current system, without compromising as much privacy.
Current law enforcement methods of genetic investigation are both haphazard and
underregulated. In early 2018, U.S. law enforcement officers investigating the Golden
State Killer case were able to home in on a
suspect after querying GEDmatch, a publicly
accessible database that encourages consum-

ers to upload genetic data coupled with personal identifiers in order to gain insights into
their genealogy. Without authorization from
a court, law enforcement simply pretended
to be the donor of what was, in fact, crime
scene DNA. Through that ruse, officers found
a match to a person in the database who was
distantly related to Joseph DeAngelo, the
man ultimately arrested for the crimes. Since
these revelations came to light last spring,
multiple law enforcement agencies have
used similar long-range familial searches of
publicly accessible databases to close 13 cold
cases, including several murders (2, 4).
In the Golden State case, the government
could justify its action by pointing to the fact
that GEDmatch is advertised as a publicly accessible database—one that does not specifically ban the type of deception police used in
that case. But publicly accessible databases
are not the only source of genetic information that law enforcement might query. For
instance, if accessing such a database fails
to yield a useful result, which will often be
the case, law enforcement could resort to
private databases, such as those maintained
by direct-to-consumer (DTC) companies, e.g.,
23andMe and Ancestry.com. Although these
databases are not as easily exploited as databases meant to be accessed by the public, in
most jurisdictions in the United States and
throughout the world a subpoena is all that
law enforcement needs to force those companies to determine whether they have a match
with crime scene data. A subpoena only
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The alleged Golden State Killer, Joseph
DeAngelo, appears at his arraignment in
Sacramento, California, in late April.

INSIGHTS

UNIVERSAL DATABASE
The first obvious benefit of a universal database is its potential for solving or deterring
serious crimes such as murder, rape, robbery,
and burglary. As both research and anecdotal
reports indicate, DNA matches have often
been crucial in catching the perpetrators of
such crimes and useful in identifying bodies and remains as well (8, 9). Unfortunately,

from law enforcement’s perspective, forensic databases that contain only genetic data
of arrestees and those convicted of crimes
have serious limitations, a fact demonstrated
by law enforcement’s increasing reliance on
publicly accessible and private databases,
composed almost entirely of “innocent” individuals. And when law enforcement chooses
the latter route, a match is by no means
guaranteed; additionally, considerable inefficiency is likely if the effort to find a match
requires consulting numerous companies, all
of which may need to re-analyze their sample
to generate the relevant profile.
Just as important, a universal database
would eliminate or reduce problems associated with the current haphazard genetic
investigative regime. First, such a database
would virtually erase the government’s incentive to conduct long-range familial DNA
searches of the type used in the Golden State
Killer case. It would thus markedly alleviate
the impact on innocent people who happen
to be related to criminals and whom police
are likely to treat as suspects unless and until
countervailing evidence surfaces.
Second, a universal database would eliminate the temptation on the part of law enforcement to use public, DTC, or research
databases for investigative purposes. Indeed,
for reasons we give below, universal database
legislation should prohibit law enforcement
officials from trawling nongovernmental
DNA sources such as GEDMatch, Ancestry.
com and research-oriented databases. That
in turn might enhance research into diseases,
treatments, and other socially beneficial avenues because studies indicate that many
people, especially those of color, are reluctant
to provide genetic information to researchers
out of fear it will be misused by the government (10, 11).
Last, a universal database would be less
discriminatory than the government’s current method of compelling genetic samples.
If the government collects DNA only from
convicted individuals or only from individuals arrested for serious crimes—as is true as
a matter of law in the United Kingdom and
as a practical matter with the U.S. Combined
DNA Index System (CODIS)—there is real
concern that the resulting databases will be
skewed against the disadvantaged because
they are the ones most likely to be the focus
of such convictions and arrests.
The situation in the United States has been
exacerbated by federal, state, and local governments now creating “shadow” databases
(9)—not only of people arrested for any crime
but also of people who are merely stopped
on suspicion of having committed a crime
without being arrested (the so-called “stopand-spit” and “swab-and-go” practices). As a
result, arrest-based DNA databases contain a
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huge proportion of the young nonwhite male
population and a much smaller representation of other groups (9, 12). Indeed, that is
why police had to rely on a publicly accessible
database to catch the Golden State Killer, a
white former police officer; in sharp contrast
to government DNA caches such as CODIS,
public and DTC databases tend to contain the
genetic data of predominately white individuals, generally from higher income brackets.
Despite these advantages of a universal
database, many concerns have been raised
about its privacy implications and the associated potential for misuse of genetic information. As a result, in some countries a universal
database is clearly prohibited. In S. and
Marper v. United Kingdom (13), the European
Court of Human Rights concluded that the
indefinite retention of biological samples and
profiles (including not only genetic data but
also fingerprints and other biological information) is a violation of the right to privacy
protected under the European Convention of
Human Rights. That not only spells doom for
universal genetic databases, it also prohibits
long-term databases composed of profiles of
people who are arrested but not convicted.
In response to Marper, the United Kingdom,
which had been retaining the DNA samples
of virtually all arrestees, now destroys such
samples immediately if collected from individuals charged with minor crimes and after
3 years for those arrested for serious crimes.
Although Marper applies only in the Council
of Europe’s 47 member countries, many other
countries follow its dictates (1).
ALLAYING CONCERNS
To some extent, the decision in Marper is
based on fear that those in the database will
be associated with criminality. But that drawback is specific to databases that focus on
arrestees; the criminal stigma of being in a
database is eliminated if everyone’s DNA is
acquired. More relevant is Marper’s objection that broad collection of genetic material
might increase “the risk of abuse and arbitrariness” (13). These concerns would clearly
be raised by the establishment of a universal
database, but they can be allayed in a number
of ways.
Most important to recognize is that a forensic database would only require a subset
of genetic markers with little to no medical
relevance. Profiles would consist of a few
dozen short-tandem repeats, with perhaps a
modest expansion of the 20 CODIS loci currently used to improve the identification of
degraded samples or the addition of a limited subset of “forensic” single-nucleotide
polymorphisms to enhance the identification of more distant relatives in the rare instances in which familial searches were still
needed (3). As a result, these law enforce23 NOVEMBER 2018 • VOL 362 ISSUE 6417
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requires showing that the data sought are
relevant to an investigation and is therefore
much simpler to get than a warrant based on
probable cause.
Until now law enforcement has largely
focused its efforts on targeting publicly accessible resources such as GEDmatch. But
requests for privately maintained data are
likely to become much more frequent in
the future, given the increasing value of genetic data to law enforcement, the low level
of justification required for a subpoena, and
the tremendous amount of effort that can be
associated with long-range familial searching by using a resource such as GEDmatch,
which might generate dozens or hundreds of
possible leads in a given case (2).
If publicly accessible databases and DTC
companies are of no help, law enforcement
might try to access genetic data in the possession of healthcare providers and researchers.
Again, only a subpoena is needed to obtain
genetic information contained in patients’
electronic medical records under the U.S.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (5). And although biomedical research efforts are often protected by
government-issued Certificates of Confidentiality (6), which purport to assure participants
that research data are immune from court
orders, the enhanced protections recently
conveyed by the U.S. 21st Century Cures Act
of 2016 remain largely untested in the courts.
Further, because Certificates of Confidentiality typically apply only to research funded by
the National Institutes of Health and other
agencies within the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, genetic research
funded by other sources remains largely unprotected unless a request for a Certificate of
Confidentiality is made and granted.
Last, in addition to these public and private resources, a government interested in
using DNA to help solve crimes can maintain
its own database. In the United States, many
states and the federal government maintain
DNA profiles not only of convicted felons but
also of those simply arrested for a felony or,
in some cases, even a misdemeanor (1). The
U.S. Supreme Court has given its imprimatur
to such databases (7). As we explain below,
this development is one of the most potent
reasons for considering establishment of a
more comprehensive genetic database.
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nature of the database would all but guarantee the adoption of strong security measures such as those just described, as well as
the enactment of harsh penalties for abuse
of the type currently associated with misuse
of data in CODIS (a fine of up to $250,000
or imprisonment for up to 1 year). That is
because members of Congress would know
that government DNA harvesting would no
longer focus solely on out-groups but would
also sweep in their own
DNA. As the ubiquity of
federal and state legislation
strictly regulating the privacy of communications records and tax information
suggests,
slippery-slope
concerns about government collection and exploitation of every citizen’s full
genetic makeup dissipate
in a regime in which legislators, their kin,
and their key constituents will be affected
just like everyone else.
These concerns are further minimized in
jurisdictions such as the United States and
Europe that, unlike many countries that have
considered a universal database, have codified basic privacy protections that would mitigate the potential for abuse or misuse of the
data (for example, the Privacy Act of 1974 and
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act in the U.S., and the General Data Protection Regulation in Europe).

“...legislators, their
kin, and their key
constituents will
be affected just like
everyone else.”
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IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
There remain implementation issues that
would need to be debated by the public and
ultimately resolved by Congress, including
whether a universal database should be populated by obtaining samples from all newborns or instead through a census-style effort
(or a combination of both), how to collect the
DNA of visitors from other countries, and the
appropriate incentives to promote compliance with the program.
The ethical objections to mandating forensic profiling of newborns and/or compelling every citizen or visitor to submit to a
buccal swab or to spit in a cup when they
have done nothing wrong are not trivial. But
newborns are already subject to compulsory medical screening, and people coming
from foreign countries to the United States
already submit to fingerprinting. It is also
worth noting that concerns about coercion
or invasions of privacy did not give pause to
legislatures (or, for that matter, even the European Court) when authorizing compelled
DNA sampling from arrestees, who should
not forfeit genetic privacy interests simply
by virtue of being arrested.
A universal database would not be cheap;
extrapolating from a $20- to $40-per-profile

estimate for the existing CODIS system calculated in 2010 (15), compiling a database
of ~350 million people could cost between
$7.5 billion and $15 billion dollars. Although
this figure does not include implementation
costs (which are difficult to estimate), the
economies of scale associated with a universal system, coupled with the declining cost
of forensic profiling, would likely drive this
figure lower.
In addition, the societal and economic
benefits that could be derived from the system could easily offset these costs. Criminal
activity is extremely expensive for private
citizens (both monetarily and in terms of
intangible harms to victims), third parties
(such as businesses and insurers), and the
government (for police investigations and
incarceration). There is evidence that existing forensic databases have more than
made up for their initial costs by increasing
the efficiency, accuracy, and success rate of
ongoing criminal investigations and by deterring would-be criminals (15).
At the very least, putting the idea of a universal forensic database on the table would
spur a long overdue debate about the deficiencies of the current system and, more broadly,
our societal commitment to privacy, fairness,
and equal protection under the law. j
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ment profiles would reveal substantially
less sensitive information than the thousands (or hundreds of thousands) of genetic
variants, often coupled with individual and
family medical histories, that are found in
the healthcare, research, or DTC ecosystems
that law enforcement might otherwise be
tempted to commandeer.
Many other protections against misuse
of DNA databases can and should be created by the relevant legislative body (which, in the
United States, would be
Congress, given the nationwide impact of the law).
For instance, legislation
could require that genetic
data not only be uncoupled
from any personal identifiers within the system, as
it is in CODIS, but also establish a more robust “unmasking” process
that limits law enforcement access to any
personal information until an association
has been made and confirmed (a procedure better monitored through one central
system than state-by-state or company-bycompany). In further contrast to the current
system, legislation might limit access to the
database to specific circumstances, such as
investigations into felonies and identification of missing persons’ remains.
Universal database legislation should also
require that the DNA database be housed in
an independent agency and that access to it
be authorized by a warrant (not just a subpoena) based on probable cause to believe a
match will produce a perpetrator (a showing
that is usually impossible with a database
that is not universal). Most important, the
law should require that the physical samples
analyzed to create the database be destroyed
after obtaining the relevant genetic information, to mitigate the risk that the sample will
be subjected to further analysis or used for
purposes other than populating the database.
Additional privacy protection could be realized through emerging cryptographic protocols that control access to genomic data
through multiple keys. Where more than one
organization is required to “turn the key” to
decrypt any record, the risk of a rogue individual or agency misusing the resource is
substantially mitigated (14). Simultaneously,
because law enforcement needs would be
fully met, Congress should (and probably
would) severely restrict the ability of law
enforcement to search other health-care, research, or DTC databases, increasing trust
in these activities and avoiding government
access to the more complete genetic information housed there.
Whatever its precise structure, the most
important point is that the population-wide
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